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Abstract
Deterministic chaos, and even maximum computational complexity, have
been discovered within Newtonian dynamics. Encouraged by comparisons of
the economy with the weather, a Newtonian system, economists assume that
prices and price changes can also obey abstract mathematical laws of motion.
Meanwhile, sociologists and other postmodernists advertise that physics and
chemistry have outgrown their former limitations, that chaos and complexity
provide  new holistic paradigms for science, and that the boundaries between
the hard and the soft sciences, once impenetrable, have disappeared along
with the Berlin Wall. Three hundred years after the deaths of Galileo,
Descartes, and Kepler, and the birth of Newton, reductionism would appear
to be on the decline, with holistic approaches to science on the upswing. We
therefore examine the evidence that dynamical laws of motion may be
discovered from empirical studies of chaotic or complex phenomena, and
also review the foundations of reductionism.
2Socio-economic fields and "system theory"
I define "system theory" to include mathematical models written in terms of
systems of deterministic and stochastic ordinary and partial differential
equations, iterated maps, and deterministic and stochastic automata. The idea
is to include every possible kind of dynamical modelling.
In attempts to describe socio-economic phenomena from the standpoint of
system theory it is Platonically assumed that the probability distributions
describing prices and price changes, or other social factors, are determined by
an objective mathematical law that governs how the economic system
evolves [1]. This assumption is not only sufficient but is also necessary if the
idea of mathematical law in economics is to make any sense. In physics and
chemistry the ideas of entropy, thermodynamics, and nonequilibrium
statistical mechanics are grounded in universally-valid microscopic
dynamics. Without the underlying dynamics of particles, fluids and solid or
plastic bodies there would be no dynamical origin for macroscopic probability
distributions.
By a mathematical law of nature I mean a law of motion, a mathematical law
of time-evolution. Galileo and Kepler discovered the simplest special cases.
Their local laws were generalized by Newton to become three universally-
valid laws of motion, along with a universal law of gravity. Newton's laws
are "universal" in the following sense: they can be verified, often with very
high decimal precision, regardless of where and when on earth (or on the
moon or in an artificial satellite) careful, controlled experiments, or careful
observations, are performed. It is the main purpose of this paper to stress the
3implications of the fact that no comparable result has ever been found in the
socio-economic fields.
"Laws" of economics, "laws" of human behavior, and the Darwin-Wallace
"laws" of fitness, competition, selection and adaptation are sometimes
mentioned in the same context as laws of motion of inanimate matter
(physics and chemistry), although since the time of Galileo the word "law" in
the first three cases does not have the same import as in the case of physico-
chemical phenomena. Confusion over what constitutes a law of nature is
ancient: Aristotle invented a purely qualitative, holistic approach to the
description of nature. Not recognizing any distinction between the different
uses of the idea of natural law, he lumped together as "motion" the rolling of
a ball, the education of a boy, and the growth of an acorn [2]. Ibn-Rushd
realized that Aristotle's philosophy is consistent with a purely mechanistic
picture of the universe. The growing influence of the mechanistic
interpretation of nature in western Europe set Tomasso d'Aquino into
motion in the thirteenth century. Aristotle did not use mathematics, but
mechanism and mathematics go hand in hand. Is human nature, in some
still-unknown mathematical sense, also mechanistic?
In the first chapter of his text on elementary economics [3], Samuelson tries to
convince both the reader and himself that the difference between the socio-
economic fields and the laws of physics is blurry, so that economics can be
treated as if it would also be a science subject to mathematical law. Samuelson
claims that physics is not necessarily as lawful as it appears, that the laws of
physics depend subjectively on one's point of view. His argument is based on
a nonscientific example of ambiguity from the visual perception of art (figure
41), and is genetically related through academic mutation and evolution to a
viewpoint that has been advanced by the postmodernist and
deconstructionist movement in art, literature, philosophy, psychology, and
sociology. The latter argue that a text has no more meaning than the symbols
on a printed page, that there is no universal truth, and therefore no universal
laws of nature, and that Platonic-Ptolemeic astronomy and Aristotelian
physics are still just as valid as fields of scientific study as are physics and
astronomy since Galileo and Kepler (who revived the spirit of Archimedes).
Samuelson notes that physics relies on controlled experiments, and adds that
in the socio-economic fields it is generally impossible to perform controlled
experiments. This is not an excuse for bad science: controlled experiments are
also impossible in astronomy where mathematical laws of nature have been
verified with high decimal precision. See also Feynman [4] for criticism of the
lack of isolation of cause and effect in the psycho-social fields.    
Platonists in mathematics [5] form another category, believing that
mathematical laws exist objectively and govern everything that happens.
Physics is neither Aristotelian (qualitative and "holistic") nor Platonic
(relying upon wishful thinking, because the "expected" mathematical laws
are not grounded in careful, repeatable empiricism).
The divorce of the study of nature from Platonic and Aristotelian notions was
initiated by Galileo and Descartes [6], but that divorce was not complete: with
Galileo's empirical discoveries of two local laws of nature, the law of inertia
and the local law of gravity, physics became a precise mathematico-empirical
science. Biology, excepting the study of heredity since Mendel and excepting
5biochemistry and biophysics since the advent of quantum mechanics, has
continued through the age of Darwin and beyond as a largely descriptive
science in the tradition of Aristotle, with reliance upon vague,
mathematically-undefined notions like "competition, natural selection and
adaptation".
I will explain why economic and other social phenomena lie beyond the
bounds of understanding from the standpoint of dynamical modelling that
attempts to describe the time-evolution of systems, even if the goal is merely
to extract the crudest features like coarsegrained statistics. I will give reasons
why mathematical laws of economics do not exist in any empirical or
computationally-effective [7] sense. In order to make my argument precise, I
first review some little-known and poorly-understood facts about
deterministic dynamical systems that include Newton's laws of motion for
particles and rigid bodies, and also nondiffusive chemically-reacting systems.
What does "nonintegrable" mean?
We expect that any system of ordinary differential equations generating
critical (orbitally-metastable), chaotic (orbitally-unstable), or complex
dynamics must be both nonlinear and nonintegrable. Most of us think that
we can agree on the meaning of "nonlinear". Before asking "What is
complexity?" we first define what "nonintegrable" means [8,9].
The ambiguity inherent in both serious and superficial attempts to
distinguish "integrability" from "nonintegrability" was expressed poetically by
Poincaré, who stated that a dynamical system is generally neither integrable
6nor nonintegrable, but is more or less integrable [10]. For most scientists the
explanation of various roots to chaos (via period doubling, e.g.) has tended to
submerge rather than clarify the question how to distinguish those two ideas,
but without eliminating many misconceptions. Modern mathematicians
have managed to give some precise definitions of nonintegrability [11] that
are hard to translate into simpler mathematics. Here, I try to describe what
"nonintegrability" means geometrically and analytically.  
For the sake of precision I frame my discussion in the context of flows in
phase space,
dx
dt
 = V(x)
,       (1)
where phase space is a flat inner product space so that the n axes labeled by
(x1,...,xn) can be regarded as Cartesian [12], and V(x) is an n-component time-
independent velocity field. Newtonian dynamical systems can always be
rewritten in this form whether or not the variables xi defining the system in
physical three dimensional space are Cartesian (for example, it is allowed
have x1 = θ and x2 = dθ/dt, where θ is an angular variable). Flows that
preserve the Cartesian volume element dΩ = dx1...dxn are defined by ∇⋅V = 0
(conservative flows) while driven dissipative-flows correspond to ∇⋅V ≠  0,
where 
 
∇ denotes the Cartesian gradient in n dimensions.
For a velocity field whose components satisfy the condition  V1 + ... + Vn = 0,
then the global conservation law x1 + ... + xn = C follows. This abstract case
includes chemically-reacting systems with concentration xi for species i.
7For a flow and for any initial condition xo the solution xi(t) = U(t)xio has no
finite time singularities [13] because singularities of trajectories of flows are
confined to the complex time plane: the time evolution operator U(t) exists
for all real finite times t and defines a one-parameter transformation group
with inverse U-1(t) = U(-t), so that one can in principle integrate backward in
time, xoi =  U(-t)xi(t), as well as forward. In other words, even driven-
dissipative flows are perfectly time-reversible.
Many researchers use floating point arithmetic in numerical integrations of
chaotic systems but uncontrollable errors are introduced into numerical
integrations by the use of floating point arithmetic, and those errors violate
time reversibility in the simplest of cases. Even for a nonchaotic driven-
dissipative flow floating-point errors will prevent accurate numerical
solutions either forward or backward in time after only a relatively short time
[12]. The simplest example is given by the one dimensional flow  dy/dt = y,
all of whose streamlines have the positive Liapunov exponent λ = 1 forward
in time, and the negative Liapunov exponent λ = - 1  backward in time.
Consequently, the simple linear equation dy/dt = y cannot be integrated
forward in time accurately numerically, for moderately-long times, if floating
point arithmetic is used.
Chaotic unimodal maps zn = f(zn-1) like the logistic map f(x) = Dx(1-x) have a
multi-valued inverse zn-1 = f-1(zn) and therefore are not uniquely time-
reversible. Contrary to superficial appearances based upon an unwarranted
extrapolation of a numerical calculation, time reversal is not violated by the
Lorenz model
8   d x1
d t
= σ (x2 ± x1)
d x2
d t
= ρx1 ± x2 ± x1x3
d x3
d t
= ± βx3 + x1x2
    (1b)
in the chaotic regime. The well-known numerically-suggested one
dimensional cusp map (figure 2) zn = f(zn-1) that represents maxima of a time
series [14] of x3(t) at discrete times to, t1, ..., tn, ... , where tn-tn-1 denotes the
time lag between successive maxima zn-1 = x3(tn-1) and zn = x3(tn), can not
have a double-valued inverse                     zn-1 = f-1(zn): backward integration
zn-1 = U(tn-1 -tn)zn is unique for a flow, and the Lorenz model satisfies the
boundedness condition for a flow [14]. Therefore, Lorenz's one dimensional
cusp map zn = f(zn-1) is not continuous and may even be infinitely fragmented
and nondifferentiable in order that the inverse map f-1 doesn't have two
branches. Note that the Lorenz model may describe a chemically-reacting
system if β = 0 and σ = ρ = 1, in which case the flow is driven-dissipative but is
not chaotic (the flow is orbitally-stable, with no positive Liapunov exponent
in forward integration).
Surprise has been expressed that it was found possible to describe a certain
chaotic flow by a formula in the form of an infinite series [8], but
"nonintegrable" does not mean not solvable: any flow, even a critical, chaotic
or complex one, has a unique, well-defined solution if the velocity field V(x)
satisfies a Lipshitz condition (a Lipshitz condition requires the definition of a
metric in phase space), or is at least once continuously differentiable, with
9respect to the n variables xi. If, in addition, the velocity field is analytic in
those variables then the power series
 xi(t) = xio + t(Lxi)o + t2(L2xi)o/2 + ....,    (2)
where L = V⋅∇, has a nonvanishing radius of convergence, so that the
solution of (1) can in principle be described by the power series (2) combined
with analytic continuation for all finite times [15]. It is well known that this
is not a practical prescription for the calculation of trajectories at long times.
The point is that a large category of deterministic chaotic and complex flows
are precisely determined over any desired number of finite time intervals by
analytic formulae.  The Lorenz model (1b) provides an example. Analyticity is
impossible for the case of truly "random" motion (like α-particle decays),
where the specification of an initial condition does not determine a trajectory
at all (as in Feynman's path integral), or for Langevin descriptions of
diffusive motion, where almost all trajectories are also continuous and
almost everywhere nondifferentiable (as in Wiener's functional integral).
According to Jacobi and Lie, a completely integrable dynamical system has n-1
global time-independent first integrals (conservation laws) Gi(x1,...,xn) = Ci
satisfying the linear partial differential equation
dGi
dt  = V⋅∇Gi = Vk
∂Gi
∂xk
 = 0
  (3)
along any streamline of the flow. In addition, these conservation laws must
(in principle, but not necessarily via explicit construction) determine n-1
"isolating integrals" of the form xk = gk(xn,C1,...,Cn-1) for k = 1,...,n-1. When all
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of this holds then the global flow is a time-translation for all finite times t in
the Lie coordinate system
yi = Gi(x1,...,xn) = Ci, i = 1,...,n-1
yn = F(x1,...,xn) = t + D       (4)
defined by the n-1 conservation laws, and the system is called completely
integrable. The solution reduces in principle to n independent integrations,
and the flow is confined to a two-dimensional manifold that may be either
flat or curved and is determined by the intersection of the n-1 global
conservation laws. For the special case of a canonical Hamiltonian flow with f
degrees of freedom, f commuting conservation laws confine the flow to a
constant speed translation on an f dimensional flat manifold. The nth
transformation function F(x1,...,xn) is defined by integrating dt =
dxn/Vn(x1,...,xn) = dx/vn(xn,C1,...,Cn-1) to yield t + D = f(xn,C1,...,Cn-1). One then
uses the n-1 conservation laws to eliminate the constants Ci in favor of the
n-1 variables xi in f to obtain the function F. Whether one can carry out all or
any of this constructively, in practice, is geometrically irrelevant: in the
description (4) of the flow all effects of interactions have been eliminated
globally via a coordinate transformation. The transformation (4)
"parallelizes" (or "rectifies" [13]) the flow: the streamlines of (1) in the y-
coordinate system are parallel to a single axis yn for all times, and the time
evolution operator is a uniform time-translation U(t) = etd/dyn. Eisenhart
asserted formally, without proof, that all systems of differential equations (1)
are described by a single time translation operator [16], but this is possible
globally (meaning for all finite times) only in the completely integrable case.
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Although time-dependent first integrals are stressed in discussions of
integrable cases of driven-dissipative flows like the Lorenz model [8], there is
generally no essential difference between (3) and the case of n time-dependent
first integrals G'i(x1,...,xn,t) = C'i  satisfying
dGi
dt  = V⋅∇G i + 
  ∂Gi
∂t  = 0
.        (3b)
Relying on the implicit function theorem, one conservation law G'n(x1,...,xn,t)
= C'n can be used to determine a function t = F'(x1,...,xn,C'n), whose
substitution into the other n-1 time-dependent conservation laws yields n-1
time-independent ones satisfying (3).
The n initial conditions xio = U(-t)xi(t) of (1) satisfy (3b) and therefore qualify
as time-dependent conservation laws, but initial conditions of (1) are
generally only trivial local time-dependent conservation laws: dynamically
seen, there is no qualitative difference between backward and forward
integration in time. Nontrivial global conservation laws are provided by the
initial conditions yio, for i = 1, 2, ... ,      n-1, of a completely integrable flow in
the Lie coordinate system (4), where the streamlines are parallel for all finite
times: dyi/dt = 0, i = 1,...,n-1, and         dyn/dt = 1.  
Algebraic or at least analytic conservation laws [8] have generally been
assumed to be necessary in order to obtain complete integrability. For
example, Euler's description of a torque-free rigid body [12]
12
   d L 1
d t
= a L 2L 3
d L 2
d t
= ± bL 1L 3
d L
d t
= c L 1L 2
,    (5)
with positive constants a , b , and c satisfying a - b + c = 0, defines a phase flow
in three dimensions that is confined to a two dimensional sphere that follows
from angular momentum conservation  L12 + L22 + L32  = L2. Here, we have
completely integrable motion that technically violates the naive expectation
that each term in (4) should be given by a single  function: for each period τ of
the motion, the transformation function F has four distinct branches due to
the turning points of the three Cartesian components Li of angular momenta
on the sphere. In general, any "isolating integral" gk describing bounded
motion must be multivalued at a turning point. Note also that the Lorenz
model defines a certain linearly damped, driven symmetric top: to see this, set
a = 0  and b = c = 1 in (5), and ignore all linear terms in (1b).
The few mathematicians who have discussed conservation laws in the
literature usually have assumed that first integrals must be analytic or at least
continuous [13] (however, see also ref. [11] where nonanalytic functions as
first integrals are also mentioned). This is an arbitrary restriction that is not
always necessary in order to generate the transformation (4) over all finite
times: a two-dimensional flow in phase space, including a driven-dissipative
flow, is generally integrable via a conservation law but that conservation law
is typically singular. The conservation law is simply the function G(x1,x2) = C
that describes the two-dimensional phase portrait, and is singular at sources
and sinks like attractors and repellers (equilibria and limit cycles provide
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examples of attractors and repellers in driven-dissipative planar flows) [12].
For the damped simple harmonic oscillator, for example, the conservation
law has been constructed analytically [17] and is logarithmically singular at
the sink. The planar flow where dr/dt = r and dθ/dt = 0 in cylindrical
coordinates (r,θ) describes radial flow out of a source at r = 0. The
conservation law is simply θ, which is constant along every streamline and is
undefined at r = 0. This integrable flow is parallelizeable for all finite times t
simply by excluding one point, the source at r = 0 (infinite time would be
required to leave or reach an equilibrium point, but the infinite time limit is
completely unphysical). "Nonintegrable" flows do not occur in the phase
plane. What can we say about "nonintegrability" about in three or more
dimensions?
In differential equations [13] and differential geometry [18] there is also an idea
of local integrability: one can parallelize an arbitrary vector field V about any
"noncritical point", meaning about any point xo where the field V(x) does not
vanish. The size ε(xo) of the region where this parallelization holds is finite
and depends nonuniversally on the n gradients of the vector field.  This
means that we can "rectify" even chaotic and complex flows over a finite
time, starting from any nonequilibrium point xo. By analytic continuation
[11,19], this local parallelization of the flow yields n-1 nontrival "local"
conservation laws yi = Gi(x) = Ci that hold out to the first singularity of any
one of the n-1 functions Gi, in agreement with the demands of the theory of
first order linear partial differential equations (the linear partial differential
equation (3) always has n-1 functionally independent solutions, but the
solutions may be singular [17]).
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Contemplate the trajectory of a "nonintegrable" flow that passes through any
nonequilibrium point xo, and let t = 0 when x = xo. Let t(xo) then denote the
time required for the trajectory to reach the first singularity of one of the
conservation laws Gk. Such a singularity must exist, otherwise the flow
would be confined for all finite times ("globally") to a single, smooth two-
dimensional manifold. The global existence of a two-dimensional manifold
can be prevented, for example, by singularities that make the n-1
conservation laws Gi multivalued in an extension of phase space to complex
variables [11]. Generally, as with solutions of (1) defined locally by the series
expansion (2), the n-1 local conservation laws Gi will be defined locally by
infinite series with radii of convergence determined by singularities that lie
in the complex extension of phase space. The formulae (4) then hold for a
finite time 0≤t<t(xo) that is determined by the distance from xo to the nearest
complex singularity. Let x1(xo) denote the point in phase space where that
singularity causes the series defining Gi to diverge. Following Arnol'd's [13]
statement of the "basic theorem of ordinary differential equations", we
observe that the streamline of a flow (1) passing through xo can not be affected
by the singularity at x1(xo) in the following superficial sense (consistent with
the fact that the singularities of the functions Gi are either branch cuts or
phase singularities): we can again parallelize the flow about the singular point
x1(xo) and can again describe the streamline for another finite time
t(xo)≤t<t(x1) by another set of parallelized flow equations of the form (4),
where t(x1) is the time required to reach the next singularity x2(xo) of any one
of the n-1 conservation laws Gi, starting from the second initial condition
x1(xo). Reparallelizing the flow about any one of these singularities is
somewhat like resetting the calendar when crossing the international
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dateline, except that a nonintegrable flow is generally not confined globally to
a two dimensional analytic manifold.
We have reasoned that a "nonintegrable" flow is piecewise integrable:
different sets of formulae of the form (4) hold in principle for consecutive
finite time intervals 0≤t(xo)<t(x1), t(x1)≤t<t(x2), ... t(xn-1)≤t<t(xn), .... , giving
geometric meaning to Poincaré's dictum [10] that a dynamical system is
generally neither integrable nor nonintegrable but is more or less integrable.
Nonintegrable flows are describable over arbitrarily-many consecutive time
intervals by the simple formulae of the form (4) except at countably many
singular points x1(xo), x2(xo), ...  , where the n-1 initial conditions yio and the
integration constant D must be reset. The relevance for Takens's embedding
theorem is discussed in [9].
Deterministic chaos as simple dynamics
We have often read over the last twenty years that deterministic chaos can
explain complex phenomena, but without having had a definition of
"complex". This was the point of view in the era when computers were used
to try to study chaoic motions via numerical integrations without error
control, based upon floating point forward integrations of chaotic dynamical
equations (or by forward iterations of chaotic maps). We have since learned
that uncontrolled numerical integrations can be avoided, and
correspondingly that chaotic dynamics can be understood from a certain
topologic point of view as relatively simple dynamics. This "new" approach
(roughly ten years old) is the consequence of analytic studies of chaotic
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systems using controlled approximations via a purely digital method called
"symbolic dynamics".  
Symbol sequences are equivalent to digit strings in some base of arithmetic.
Since we are going to talk about digit strings it is both wise and useful to begin
with the idea of a computable number [20,21]. The reason for this is simple:
"algorithmically random" numbers and sequences "exist" in the
mathematical continuum but require infinite time and infinite precision for
their definition, and therefore have no application to either experiment or
computation.
By a computable number, we mean either a rational number or an algorithm
that generates a digit expansion for an irrational number in some base of
arithmetic, like the usual grade school algorithm for the square-root
operation in base ten (the same algorithm also works in any other integer
base). If we use computable numbers as control parameters and initial
conditions, then the chaotic dynamical systems typically studied in physics
and chemistry are computable, e.g. via (2) combined with analytic
continuation. The Lorenz model (1b) provides one example. Systems of
chemical kinetic equations provide other examples.
Seen from the perspective of computability, the local solution (2) of a
dynamical system (1) that is digitized completely in some base of arithmetic
defines an "artificial automaton", an abstract model of a computer. The
digitized initial condition constitutes the program for the automaton. In a
chaotic dynamical system the part of the program that directs the trajectory
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into the distant future is encoded as the end-string εN+1... of digits in an initial
condition xo = . ε1.ε2...εN... . For example,the binary tent map xn = f(xn-1),
f(x) = 
2x, x< 1/2
2(1 - x), x > 1/2  , (6)
can be rewritten and studied naturally in binary arithmetic by writing                     
xn = .ε1(n)ε2(n)...εn(n)..., with εi(n) = 0 or 1. The map (2) is then represented by
the simple automaton [21]
εi(n) = εi+1(n-1), ε1(n-1) = 01 - εi+1(n-1), ε1(n-1) = 1 .   (6b)
For every possible binary-encoded "computer program" xo = .ε1(0)ε2(0)...εN(0)...
this automaton performs only a trivial computation: either it reads a bit in
the program, or else flips the bit and reads it, then moves one bit to the right
and repeats the operation. The logistic map at the period doubling critical
point [22], in contrast, is capable of performing simple arithmetic.
Unlike the binary tent map in binary arithmetic, most dynamical systems do
not admit a "natural" base of arithmetic. The logistic map f(x) = Dx(1-x) with
D arbitrary and the Lorenz model are examples. The series solutions of these
dynamical systems can still be rewritten as automata in any integer base of
arithmetic, albeit in relatively cumbersome fashion. However, there is a
systematic generalization of solution of the binary Bernoulli shift map           
xn = 2xn-1 mod 1 via binary arithmetic that sometimes works: symbolic
dynamics. The symbolic dynamics of a chaotic dynamical system can be
defined, and solved digitally at least in principle, if the map has a generating
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partition [23]. For the binary tent map (6) the generating partition, in
generation n, consists of the 2n intervals l(n) = 2-n  that are obtained by
backward iteration of the entire unit interval by the map (a chaotic one
dimensional map contracts intervals in backward iteration). Each interval in
the generating partition can be labeled by an n-bit binary (L,R) address (L and
R are defined in figure 3) called a symbol sequence, as is shown in figure 4.
The symbol sequence tells us the itinerary of the map, for n forward
iterations, for any initial condition that is covered by the interval l(n)(ε1ε2...εn)
labeled by the n-bit address ε1ε2...εn, where εi = L or R [21].
Excepting pathological cases where the contraction rate in backward iteration
is too slow, an infinite length symbol sequence corresponds uniquely to an
infinitely-precise initial condition.  Given a symbol sequence, coarsegrained
statistics for any number Nn of bins in the generating partition  (Nn = 2n for
the binary tent map) can be obtained merely by reading the sequence while
sliding an N-bit window one bit at a time to the right, as is indicated in figure
5. Clearly, orbital statistics depend on initial conditions, and it is very easy to
construct algorithms for initial conditions whose orbital statistics do not
mimic the uniform invariant density of the binary tent map (e. g.,                                        
xo = .101001000100001... qualifies and follows from an obvious algorithm). I
have explained elsewhere why "random" initial conditions may be a bad
assumption for a dynamical system far from thermal equilibrium [9,21].
Because the binary tent map generates all possible infinite-length binary
sequences (almost all of which are not computable via any possible algorithm
[20]), we can use that map to generate any histogram that can be constructed in
finitely-many steps, merely by a correct choice of initial conditions [21]. Many
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different initial conditions will allow the dynamical system to generate the
same coarsegrained statistics because the precise ordering of L's and R's in a
symbol sequence doesn't matter in determining the histograms.
Liapunov exponents depend strongly on initial conditions, a fact that is not
brought out by concentration on excessively simple models like the
symmetric tent map, or numerical attempts to extract "the largest Liapunov
exponent" of a chaotic dynamical system like the Lorenz model. Chaotic
dynamical systems like the Lorenz model or the logistic map generally
generate an entire spectrum of Liapunov exponents (and therefore also a
spectrum of largest Liapunov exponents). The easiest way to understand this
is to solve for the generating partition and Liapunov exponents of the
asymmetric tent map [21], where only simple algebra is needed.
We define a class of initial conditions to consist of all initial conditions that
yield the same Liapunov exponent λ. Correspondingly, we can say that a class
of symbol sequences defines a single Liapunov exponent. The Boltzmann
entropy per iteration s(λ) of all symbol sequences with the same Liapunov
exponent λ defines the fractal dimension D(λ) = s(λ)/λ of that class of initial
conditions [12,21], so that a chaotic dynamical system generally generates
spectra of both Liapunov exponents and fractal dimensions.
Both critical [22] and chaotic [23] dynamical systems may generate a natural
partitioning of phase space, the generating partition, but not every
nonintegrable dynamical system defines a generating partition. If a
deterministic dynamical system has a generating partition then the symbolic
dynamics can in principle be solved and the long-time behavior can be
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understood qualitatively, without the need to compute specific trajectories
algorithmically from the algorithmic construction of a specific computable
initial condition. For example, one need only determine the possible symbol
sequences and then read them with a sliding n-bit window in order to
generate the statistics in the form of a hierarchy of histograms (figure 5). In
other words, a high degree of "computational compressibility" holds even if
the dynamical system is critical or chaotic.
Every chaotic dynamical system generates infinitely-many different classes of
statistical distributions for infinitely-many different classes of initial
conditions, and at most one of those distributions is differentiable (unlike the
case of equilibrium statistical mechanics, there is no empirical evidence to
suggest that nature far from equilibrium evolves from unknown initial
conditions to generate differentiable distributions [9]). The generating
partition, if it exists, uniquely forms the support of every possible statistical
distribution and also characterizes the particular dynamical system (the
intervals l(n) = 2-n characterize the binary tent map and the binary Bernoulli
shift).  For a system with a generating partition, topologic universality classes
can be defined that permit one to study the simplest system in the
universality class [24]. The infinity of statistical distributions is topologically
invariant and therefore can not be used to discern or characterize a particular
dynamical system within a universality class [21].
For maps of the unit interval, both the symmetric and asymmetric logistic
maps peaking at or above unity belong to the trivial universality class of the
binary tent map [21] (where all possible binary sequences are allowed). The
topologic universality class is described by figure 4, and is defined by the
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complete binary tree. Dynamical systems that generate complete ternary trees
or incomplete binary trees, e.g., define other universality classes. The two
dimensional Henon map belongs to the universality class of chaotic logistic
maps of the unit interval peaking beneath unity. The simplest model in this
topologic universality class is the symmetric tent map with slope magnitude
between 1 and 2, and the class is defined by a certain incomplete binary tree
[24].
In these systems the long-time behavior can be understood qualitatively and
statistically in advance, so that the future holds no surprises: the generating
partition and symbol sequences can be used to describe the motion at long
times, to within any desired degree of precision l(n), and multifractal scaling
laws (via the D(λ) spectrum) show how finer-grained pictures of trajectories
are related to coarser-grained ones. In other words, universality and scaling
imply relatively simple dynamics in spite of the fact that the word "complex"
has often been used to describe deterministic chaos.  
Complex dynamics
Scale invariance based upon criticality has been suggested as an approach to
"complex space-time phenomena" based upon the largely unfulfilled
expectation of finding universal scaling laws, generated dynamically by many
interacting degrees of freedom and yielding critical states independent of
parameter-tuning [25,26], that are ubiquitous in nature. This is equivalent to
expecting that nature is mathematically relatively simple.
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From the standpoint of computable functions and computable numbers we
can generally think of a deterministic dynamical system as a computer with
the initial condition as the program [21]. Thinking of dynamics from this
point of view, it has been discovered that there is a far greater and far more
interesting degree of complicated behavior in nonlinear dynamics than either
criticality or deterministic chaos: systems of billiard balls combined with
mirrors [27,27b], and even two-dimensional maps [28], can exhibit
universal computational capacity via formal equivalence to a Turing
machine. A system of nine first order quasi-linear partial differential
equations has been offered as a computationally-universal system [29]. A
quasi-linear first order partial differential equation in n variables can be
replaced by a linear one in n+1 variables. Maximum computational
complexity is apparently possible in systems of linear first order partial
differential equations. Such systems are nondiffusive but can describe
damped-driven dynamics and wave propagation.
For a dynamical system with universal computational capability a
classification into topologic universality classes is impossible [28]. Given an
algorithm for the computation of an initial condition to as many digits as
computer time allows, nothing can be said in advance about the future either
statistically or otherwise  except to compute the dynamics with controlled
precision for that initial condition, iteration by iteration, to see what falls out:
there is no computational compressibility that allows us to summarize the
system's long-time behavior, either statistically or otherwise. In contrast with
the case where topologic universality classes exist there is no tree-like
organization of a hierarchy of periodic orbits, stable, marginally stable, or
unstable, that allows us to understand the fine-grained behavior of an orbit
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from the coarse-grained behavior via scaling laws, or to look into the very
distant future for arbitrary (so-called "random") initial conditions via
symbolic dynamics.  There can be no scaling laws that hold independently of a
very careful choice of classes of  initial conditions. We do not know whethe
either fluid turbulence or Newton's three-body problem fall into this
category.
Some degrees of complexity are defined precisely in computer science [30]
but these definitions, based soley on computability theory, have not satisfied
physicists [31,31b,32]. According to von Neumann [33] a system is complex
when it is easier to build than to describe mathematically. Under this
qualitative definition the Henon map is not complex but a living cell is. In
earlier attempts to model biologic evolution [34,35] information was
incorrectly identified as complexity. The stated idea was to find an algorithm
that generates information, but this is too easy: the square root algorithm and
the logistic map f(x) = 4x(1-x) generate information at the rate of one bit per
iteration from rational binary initial conditions.
There is no correct model of a dynamic theory of the evolution of biologic
complexity, neither over short time intervals (cell to embryo to adult) nor
over very long time intervals (inorganic matter to organic matter to
metabolizing cells and beyond). There is no physico-chemical model of the
time-development of different degrees of complexity in nonlinear dynamics.
No one knows if universal computational capability is necessary for biologic
evolution, although DNA molecules in solution apparently are able to
compute [36], but not error-free like a Turing machine or other deterministic
dynamical system.
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Moore has speculated that computational universality should be possible in a
certain kind of conservative three degree of freedom Newtonian potential
flow [28], but so far no one has constructed an analytic example of the
required potential energy. We do not yet know the minimum number of
degrees of freedom necessary for universal computational capability in a
driven-dissipative flow (a digital computer is a very high degree of freedom
damped-driven dynamical system via electric circuit theory). Diffusive
motion is time-irreversible (U-1(t) doesn't exist for diffusive motion), but
arguments have been made that some diffusive dynamical systems may have
an asymptotic limit that is reached asymptotically-fast, where the motion is
non-diffusive and is even time reversible on a finite dimensional attractor
[37,38,39], and is therefore generated on the attractor by a finite dimensional
deterministic dynamical system (1). However, if a diffusive dynamical system
(the Navier-Stokes equations, e.g.) can be shown to be computationally-
universal then it will be impossible to discover a single attractor that would
permit the derivation of scaling laws for eddy cascades in open flows, or in
other flows, independently of specific classes of boundary and initial
conditions.
With a computationally-universal (and therefore computable) dynamical
system (1), given a specific computable initial condition xo, both that initial
condition and the dynamics can in principle be encoded as the digit string for
another computable initial condition yo. If the computable trajectory                
y(t) = U(t)yo could be digitally decoded, then we could learn the trajectory      
x(t) = U(t)xo for the first initial condition (self-replication without copying
errors). This maximum degree of computational complexity may be possible
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in low dimensional nonintegrable conservative Newtonian dynamics. Some
features of nonintegrable quantum systems with a chaotic classical limit (the
helium atom, e.g.) have been studied using uncontrolled approximations
based on the low order unstable periodic orbits of a chaotic dynamical system
[40], but we have no hint what might be the behavior of a low dimensional
quantum mechanical system with a computationally-complex Newtonian
limit. Interacting DNA molecules obey the laws of quantum mechanics but
the biologically-interesting case can not be reduced to a few degrees of
freedom.
Can new laws of nature emerge from studies of complicated motions? [42]
The empirical discovery of mathematical laws of nature arose from the study
of the simplest possible dynamical systems: classical mechanics via Galilean
trajectories of apples and Keplerian orbits of two bodies (the sun and one
planet) interacting via gravity, and quantum mechanics via the hydrogen
atom. Is there any reason to expect that simplicity can be short-circuited in
favor of complexity in the attempt to discover new mathematical laws of
nature? Some researchers expect this to be possible, but without saying how
[41]. Consider first an example from fluid dynamics where an attempt has
been made to extract a simple law of motion from a complicated time series.
Fluid turbulence provides examples of complicated motions in both space
and time in a Newtonian dynamical system of very high dimension. We
know how to formulate fluid mechanical time evolution according to
Newton's laws of motion, the Navier-Stokes equations, but infinitely many
interacting degrees of freedom represented by second order coupled nonlinear
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partial differential equations are the stumbling block in our attempt to
understand fluid turbulence mathematically. We do not understand coupled
nonlinear partial differential equations of either the first or second order well
enough to be able to derive any of the important features of fluid turbulence
in either the finite or infinite Reynold's number limit from the Navier-
Stokes equations in a systematic way that starts with the laws of energy and
momentum transport and makes controlled, systematic  approximations.
Can eddy-cascades in turbulent open flows [43] be understood by trying to
build simpler mathematical models than the Navier-Stokes equations? So
far, this goal remains nothing but an unfulfilled hope. Setting our sights
much lower, is it possible to derive a mathematical law in the form of an
iterated map that describes only the transition to turbulence, near criticality?
We have noted above that the binary tent map can generate all possible
histograms that can be constructed simply by varying classes of initial
conditions. Statistics that are generated by an unknown dynamical system are
therefore inadequate to infer the dynamical law that generates the observed
statistical behavior [21]. That is why, in any effort to derive a simplified
dynamical system that describes either turbulence or the transition to
turbulence, one cannot rely upon statistics alone. Instead, it is necessary to
extract the generating partition of the dynamical system from the empirical
data, if there is a generating partition.
Consider a low dimensional dynamical system that is described by an
unknown iterated map defined finitely by a generating partition. With
infinite precision and infinite time, it would be possible in principle to pin
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down the map's universality class and also the map, from a chaotic time
series by the empirical construction of the generating partition. With finite
precision and finite time one must always resort to some guesswork after a
few steps in the hierarchy of unstable periodic orbits, which are arranged
naturally onto a tree of some order and degree of incompleteness [24]. In
practice one can discover at most only a small section of the tree and its
degree of pruning, so if one is to narrow down the practical choices to a few
topologic universality classes of maps the observational data must be
extremely precise. Given the most accurate existing data on a fluid dynamical
system near a critical point, the unique extraction of the universality class of
an iterated map from a chaotic time series has yet to be accomplished without
physically-significant ambiguity [44], demonstrating how difficult is the
empirical problem that one faces in any attempt to extract an unknown law of
motion from the analysis of complicated empirical data.
The method of topologic universality classes [21,23,24] is the only known way
to study the long time behavior of a chaotic dynamical system systematically,
meaning without the introduction of uncontrolled and uncontrollable errors.
For truly complex dynamical systems, therefore, our analysis suggests that the
extraction of  laws of motion from empirical data is a hopeless task. This
conclusion does not provide encouragement for experimental
mathematicians who want to discover socio-economic or biologic laws of
chaotic dynamics from raw statistics or the analysis of time series [45]. The
alternative, to imagine that one could "guess" laws of nature without
adequate empirical evidence or corresponding symmetry principles, would be
to ignore the lessons of Archimedes and Galileo and revert to Platonism.
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Einstein apparently became Platonic later in life, but Platonism was not
Einstein's guiding light (or light-shade) during his generalization of
Newton's theory of gravity, because that generalization is based upon a local
invariance principle: no experiment can be performed to detect any difference
between a linearly-accelerated frame of reference and the effect of a local
gravitational field. This local symmetry principle was not accounted for by
Newtonian theory, and motivated Einstein to discover a new set of
gravitational field equations [46].  
Is socio-economic behavior (mathematically-)lawful?
Is it reasonable, even in principle, to expect that mathematical laws of socio-
economic or other mathematical laws of human behavior exist in any
humanly-discernable form? Is it possible abstractly to reduce some aspects of
human behavior to a set of universal formulae, or even to a finite set of more
or less invariant rules? Many economists and system theorists [32,47,48], and
even some sociologists [49,50], assume that this is possible.
By disregarding Galileo's historic and fruitful severing of the abstract study of
inanimate motion from imprecise Aristotelian ideas of "motion" like youths
alearning, acorns asprouting [2], and markets emerging, many mathematical
economists have attempted to describe the irregularities of individual and
collective human nature as if the price movements of a commodity, which
are determined by human decisions and man-made political and economic
rules, would define mathematical variables and abstract universal equations
of motion analogous to ballistics and astronomy (deterministic models), or
analogous to a drunken professor (stochastic models).
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Mathematical economists often speak of the economy [48], which is
determined by human behavior and man-made rules (and also in part by the
weather, geology, and other limiting physical factors), as if the economy could
be studied mathematically as an abstract dynamical system like the weather.
In the latter case the equations of motion are known but cannot be solved
approximately over large space-time regions by using floating point
arithmetic on a computer without the introduction of uncontrollable errors.
However, for specified boundary and initial conditions the weather is
determined by the mathematical equivalent of many brainless interacting
bodies that can not use intelligience to choose whether or not to obey the
deterministic differential equations whose rigid mathematical rule they are
condemned forever to follow. Chaos and complexity do not install either
randomness, freedom of choice, or arbitrariness in the solutions of
deterministic dynamical equations [21]. The absence of arbitrariness, or
freedom of choice, is part of the key to understanding why mathematics
works in physics but not in the socio-economic fields. Comparing the weather
with socio-economic behavior is not a scientifically-sound theoretical
analogy.
Contrary to certain expectations [51] and to recent extraordinary claims [52],
there is no evidence to suggest that abstract dynamical systems theory can be
used either to explain or understand socio-economic behavior. Billiard balls
and gravitating bodies have no choice but to follow mathematical trajectories
that are laid out deterministically, beyond the possibility of human
convention, invention, or intervention, by Newton's laws of motion. The
law of probability of a Brownian particle also evolves deterministically
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according to the diffusion equation beyond the possibility of human
convention, invention, or intervention. In stark contrast, a brain that directs
the movements of a body continually makes willful and arbitrary decisions at
arbitrary times that cause it to deviate from and eventually contradict any
mathematical trajectory (deterministic models) or evolving set of
probabilities (stochastic models) assigned to it in advance. Given a
hypothetical set of probabilities for a decision at one instant, there is no
algorithm that tells us how to compute the probabilities correctly for later
times, excepting at best the trivial case of curve-fitting at very short times, and
then only if nothing changes significantly. Socio-economic statistics can not
be known in advance of their occurrence because, to begin with, there are no
known socio-economic laws of motion that are correct.
Economists stress that they study open systems, whereas physics concentrates
on closed systems. This claim misses the point completely. We can describe
and understand tornadoes and hurricanes mathematically because the
equations of thermo-hydrodynamics apply, in spite of the fact that the earth's
atmosphere is an open dynamical system. We can not understand the
collapse of the Soviet Union or the financial crisis in Mexico on the basis of
any known set of dynamics equations in spite of the fact that the world
economy forms a closed financial system.
Mathematical-lawlessness reigns supreme in the socio-economic fields,
where nothing of any social or economic significance is left even
approximately invariant by socio-economic evolution, including the "value"
of the Mark. This is the reason that artificial law ("law") must be used by
governments and central banks in the attempt to regulate human behavior,
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both individually and collectively. Socio-economically, everything that is
significant changes completely unregulated in the absence of police-enforced
artificial law (the Roman method)  or strong community traditions (the tribal
method).
In the socio-economic fields there are no fundamental constants because
nothing is left invariant by the time evolution. That nothing is left invariant
is the same as saying that the system is not describable by mathematics:
dynamical systems, even discrete ones [52b], have local conservation laws.
Deterministic dynamical systems obey n-1 local conservation laws that
prevent any external constraint from being imposed on the system. You can
not "legislate" a change in the dynamics of a system that obeys a deterministic
law of motion.
The division of observable phenomena into machine-like and not-machine-
like behavior was made by Descartes [53]. In the Cartesian picture animals are
supposed to behave more like machines, like robots that respond
mechanically to stimuli. People, in contrast with robots, can reason and make
decisions freely, or at least arbitrarily. Even the most illiterate or most stupid
people can speak, can invent sentences creatively, and can behave
unpredictably in other ways as well. The most intelligent dog, cat, or cow
cannot invent intellectual complexity that is equivalent to a human language
or a capitalist economy.
We should ask: why should any part of nature behave mathematically,
simulating an automaton? Why does the mathematics of dynamical systems
theory accurately describe the motions studied in physics, but not the
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"motions" (in Aristotle's sense) studied in economics, political science,
psychology, and sociology? This question leads to Wigner's discussion of the
"unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics" in describing the inanimate
aspects of nature that physics traditionally studies, and that fields
disconnected from physics have tried unsuccessfully to imitate merely by
postulating laws of motion that do not pass the test of reproducibility of
measurements.
It is necessary to realize that, in spite of Newton's scholastic style of
presentation of his laws, which many mechanics text books unfortunately
mimic, physics is neither postulatory nor axiomatic. Physics since Galileo is
grounded in a deep interplay of empiricism and mathematical abstraction,
and the reason that this mathematical interplay is at all possible is due to
certain invariance principles (physics would be impossible in the absence of
certain fundamental constants of nature; those constants reflect certain
invariance principles).
Reductionism, invariance principles, and laws of nature
Reductionism is the arbitrary division of nature into laws of motion and
initial conditions, plus "the environment". We must always be able to neglect
"the environment" to zeroth order, because if nothing can be isolated then a
law of motion can never be discovered. For example air resistance had to be
negligible in order that Galileo could discover the law of inertia and the local
law of gravity.
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The empirical discovery of mathematical laws of motion that correctly
describe nature is impossible in the absence of empirically-significant
invariance principles, but there are no laws of nature that can tell us the
initial conditions. Following Wigner, laws of motion themselves obey laws
called invariance principles, while initial conditions are completely lawless
[54]. Why must mathematical laws of motion that describe nature obey
invariance principles?
"It is not necessary to look deeper into the situation to realize that laws of
nature could not exist without principles of invariance. This is explained in
many texts of elementary physics even though only few of the readers of
these texts have the maturity necessary to appreciate these explanations. If the
correlations between events changed from day to day, and would be different
for different points of space, it would be impossible to discover them. Thus
the invariances of the laws of nature with respect to displacements in space
and time are almost necessary prerequisites that it be possible to discover, or
even catalogue, the correlations between events which are the laws of nature.
                                        E. P. Wigner in    Symmetries     and     Reflections   [54]
Nearly every elementary physics text shows that the experiments that Wigner
had in mind are the parabolic trajectories of apples and blocks sliding down
inclined planes, the two physical systems originally studied by Galileo in his
empirical discovery of the local versions of Newton's first two laws of
motion. Those discoveries would have been impossible in the absence of four
fundamental invariance principles.
34
Without translational and rotational invariance in space and translational
invariance in time (at least locally, on earth and within our solar system),
simple mathematical laws of motion like the Keplerian planetary orbits and
the Galilean trajectories of apples could not have been discovered in the first
place. The experiments that are needed to discover the law of inertia are
precisely reproducible because absolute position and absolute time are
irrelevant as initial conditions, which is the same as saying that space is
homogeneous and isotropic (space is locally Euclidean) and that the flow of
time is uniform. The translational invariance of the law of inertia dp/dt=0
means that the law of inertia can be verified regardless of where, in a tangent
plane on earth, you perform the required experiment. The law of Galilean
invariance is inherent in the law of inertia.
Socio-economic phenomena are not invariant in any empirically-discernable
sense. Socio-economic time-development and the corresponding statistics
depend upon absolute position and absolute time, which is the same (for all
practical purposes) as admitting that socio-economic "motions" are not
reducible to a well-defined dynamical system.
Dynamical laws of motion are postulated in economics, but the laws of
physics are not mere postulates: mathematical laws of time-development
come second, invariance principles come first. The law of inertia had to be
discovered first (Galileo/Descartes) before Newton could write down his
second order differential equation that generalizes Galileo's two local
empirical laws, the law of inertia and the local law of gravity. Described from
the standpoint of invariance and symmetry, the law of inertia is the
foundation of all of physics: from it and Galileo's local law of gravity follow
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two of Newton's three laws of motion and his law of gravity as a
generalization, when Kepler's first law and the action-reaction principle are
used [12]. It is superficial and misleading to imagine that the law of inertia can
be "derived" from Newton's second law merely by setting the net force equal
to zero.
If absolute time and absolute position were relevant initial conditions then
neither the law of inertia nor the local law of gravity would hold: identically
prepared experiments would yield entirely different outcomes in different
places and at different times. In this case there could have been no regularities
discovered by Galileo, and no generalizations to universal laws of classical
mechanics could have been proposed by Newton. Physics would, in that case,
have remained Aristotelian and consequently would have evolved like
economics, sociology, psychology, and political science: the study of a lot of
special cases with no universal time-evolution laws that permit the
prediction, or at least understanding, of phenomena over more than the
short time intervals where curve-fitting sometimes "works", and with no
qualitative understanding whatsoever of the phenomena underlying the
observed "motions" and their corresponding statistics.
System theorists commonly assume that the economy operates like a
dynamical system, the equivalent of an automaton that is too simple to
simulate any kind of creative behavior, including the violation of politically-
enforced laws as occurred during the collapse of the government of the
former Soviet Union and the peasant rebellion in Chiapas. This is a strange
assumption. Without human brains and human agreements based upon
language, "laws" of economic behavior certainly could not exist. Dogs, cows
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and even peasants generally don't invent money-economies. In contrast, the
available geological and astronomical evidence indicates that Newton's laws
of motion held locally in our corner of the universe long before human
languages emerged on earth.
Wigner considers that we can not rule out that "holistic" laws of nature
(beyond general relativity, for example) might exist, but if so then we have no
way to discover them. Reductionism can not explain everything
mathematically, but reductionism is required in order to explain the
phenomena that can be understood mathematically from the human
perspective. Maybe an "oracle" would be required in order to discern the
workings of a holistic law of motion.
Summarizing, universal laws that are determined by regularities of nature
differ markedly from human-created systems of merely conventional
behavior. The latter consist of learned, agreed-on, and communally- or
politically-enforced behavior, which can always be violated by willful or at
least clever people. People and groups who violate artificial law are
sometimes called either "progressive" or "outlaw", depending on which
social group does the labeling. In Wigner's language, all socio-economic
initial conditions matter because of the lack of invariance, so that it is
impossible to discover any underlying correlations that could be identified as
mathematical laws of socio-economic "progress" (note that the idea of
progress is also a "motion" only in the Aristotelian rather than in the
Galilean sense).
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Darwinism and neo-Darwinism [551]
"From a physicist's viewpoint, though, biology, history, and economics can be
viewed as dynamical systems."
       P. Bak and M. Paczuski in     Complexity,      Contingency,     and     Criticality   [52]
"Reductionism" (a better word is "science") is criticized by "holists" for not
taking us far enough in our understanding of the world (see the introduction
to ref. [32] and also [56]; see also any attempt by the so-called postmodernists to
discuss science [57]). Some holists hope to be able to mathematize Darwinism
in order to go beyond physics and chemistry (see discussions of "complex
adaptable systems" [32]), but so far they have not been able use their invented
dynamics models to predict or explain anything that occurs in nature. Physics
and astronomy, since the divorce from Platonic mathematics and
Aristotlelian "holism" in the seventeenth century, have a completely
different history (or "evolution") than "political economy" and most of
biology. "Emergence, selection, and adaptation" are buzz words used by
Darwin-oriented holists (see ref. [58] for an alternative form of "holism"),
while postmodernists like to toss around the notion of "a new paradigm for
science". According to the postmodernists, "chaos" (which is merely a part of
classical mechanics or chemical kinetics) is an example of "a new paradigm".
"Paradigms" are very important for philosophers who have not understood
science at the level of Galilean kinematics, and who can not distinguish
science from pseudo-seience. Paradigms and "metaphors" are also important
                                    
1
  Kelly's book "Out of control" is a bible of "paradigms" of postmodernist
"holistic" thought.
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for people who know that a particular model doesn't represent what the
researcher purports to study, but wants to claim that it does anyway.
The Aristotelian dream of a holistic approach to physics, biology, economics,
history, and other phenomena was revived by Bertanffly in 1968 [59] under
the heading of system theory. System theory proposes to use mathematics to
describe the time evolution of "the whole", like a living organism or a
money-economy, but generally in the absence of adequate information about
the local correlations of the connected links that determine the behavior of
the whole.  
I call attempts to quantify the Aristotelian style of thought "reductionist
holism", or "holistic reductionism" because any mathematization
whatsoever is an attempt at reductionism [42]. Quantification necessarily
ignores all nonquantifiable qualities, and there are plenty of qualitative and
quantitative considerations to ignore if we want to restrict our considerations
to a definite mathematical model. Some physicists tend to believe that
physics, which is successful reductionism (often with several-to-high decimal
accuracy in agreement between theory and reproducible observations),
provides the basis for understanding everything in nature, but only in
principle [60].
There is no effective way to "reduce" the study of DNA to the study of quarks
but this is not a failure of reductionism: both quarks and DNA are accounted
for by quantum mechanics at vastly different length scales. In order to adhere
to the illusion that reductionism might also be able account for biological and
societal phenomena beyond DNA in principle, physicists must leave out of
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consideration everything that hasn't been accounted for by physics, which
includes many practical problems that ordinary people face in everyday life.
When sociologists [49,50] (who, unlike physicists, claim to interest themselves
in the doings of ordinary people) try to follow suit but merely postulate or
talk about dynamics "paradigms" in the absence of empirically-established
invariance principles, then they reduce their considerations of society to
groundless mathematical models, to artificial simulations of life that have
nothing to do with any important quality of life.
Every computer simulation of a society or an economy is merely the creation
of an abstract artificial and brainless society or an artificial and brainless
economy. Mathematical simulations cannot adequately describe real societies
and real economies although, through adequate politico-financial
enforcement, which is truly a form of selection, we can be constrained to
simulate some economist's simulation of society and economics. A money
economy represents a selection based upon material resources and human
needs, desires, and illusions. The idealized free market system described by
Adam Smith's "invisible hand" represents a vague notion of autonomy, or
self-regulation, inspired in part by Calvinism and in part by Watt's flywheel
governor, but is in no scientific sense a "natural" selection.
Darwin's ideas of "natural selection, fitness, and adaptation" may appear to
make sense in both sports and the socio-economic context of daily life but
they are not scientifically-defined mathematical terms. That they remind us
of the description of an organized market economy is not accidental: Darwin
was strongly influenced during the cruise of the Beagle by his second reading
of Malthus [61], who was both a protestant preacher and a worldly
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philosopher. Terms like "selection" and "adaptation" are reminiscent of
Adam Smith's vague "invisible hand" rather than of scientifically well-
defined processes like the dissociation and recombination of DNA molecules
described by quantum mechanics or chemical kinetics.
In an attempt to model the origin of life, chemical kinetic equations have
been used to try either to discover or to invent Darwinism at the molecular
level [35] but the use of that terminology seems either superfluous or forced: a
deterministic system of ordinary differential equations, whether chemical
kinetic or not, can be described by the relatively precise, standard terminology
of dynamical systems theory (stability, attractors, etc.). A stochastic system of
chemical kinetic equations can be described by purely dynamic terminology
combined with additional terms like "most probable distribution" and
"fluctuations". There is far less reason to believe that Darwin's socio-
economic terminology applies at the macromolecular level than there was,
before 1925, to believe that the language of the Bohr model correctly described
the motions of electrons relative to nuclei in hydrogen and helium atoms.
There are two main sources of Darwin's vague notion of "natural selection".
The social-Darwinist origin of the phrase is Malthus's socio-economic
doctrine, which derives from Calvinism [61] and can be traced through the
late medieval revival of puritanism by Luther, Calvin, and Zwingli back to
the neo-Platonist St. Augustine [6], who bequeathed to the west the notion of
selection called "predestination". In "predestination" humans are divided
completely arbitrarily into "the elect" and "the damned" (according to Luther,
man is only an ass ridden by both God and the devil, with no choice
whatsoever as to his ultimate fate [62]).  Here, "selection" is not a
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mathematical idea that describes the time-evolution of a dynamical system.
The second and only scientific motivation for Darwin's vague idea of
"natural selection" came from plant and animal breeding, which he
mislabeled as "artificial selection." Plant and animal breeding constitute the
only true case of selection because they proceed via manipulating certain
initial conditions in order to try to achieve a desired result.
Darwinists, true to their Aristotelian heritage, are condemned to argue
endlessly to try to find out what their terminology means because that
terminology is, from a scientific standpoint (empiric or theoretic), completely
undefined.
The scientific foundation of organic evolution was established in Darwin's
time by Mendel, who chose to become an Augustinian monk out of financial
necessity [39] and was trained more in mathematics and physics than in
biology.  In contrast with Luther and Calvin, Mendel was not Augustinian in
education and outlook: he was even a lecturer in experimental physics for a
while, and approached the problem of heredity via isolation of cause and
effect in the spirit of a physicist (or a good auto mechanic2 ).
Darwin and his contemporaries, in contrast, accepted a holistic (or
"integrated") picture of heredity that made the understanding of genetics
impossible [64]. It was only after Mendel's reductionist discovery that some
biologists began to dislodge themselves from the teleological notion of
organic evolution as progress toward a goal predetermined by a selector (or
                                    
2
 Personally, I would not entrust my auto to a self-proclaimed "holist" for
trouble-shooting prior to necessary repairs. See also Ginsburg [63b] for a
nonmathematical alternative to holism in the social sciences.
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read by an "oracle" capable of "infinite knowledge" of both future and past).
By ignoring "the whole" in favor of the most important parts inferred from
performing simple, controlled experiments, Mendel found the key that
divorced the study of heredity from unsystematic tinkering and socio-
economic doctrine and changed it into a precise mathematical science [64b].
Today, Darwinist concepts play a part in genetics research that is comparable
to the role played by "waves" in high energy physics. "Wave-particle duality",
rather than the Dirac-Feynman interpretation of quantum mechanics, is still
taught in physics and chemistry courses, but you may scour the literature to
no avail in an attempt to find reference to this cumbersome and unnecessary
philosophic principle in particle physics research papers.
  
Human history is narrative. This includes the statistics of socio-economic
phenomena, which constitute only one very small part of the entire
narrative, a quantitative part. There is no reason to expect that the
uncontrolled approximations of system theory modelling can tell us as much,
quantitatively or qualitatively, about social or individual behavioral
phenomena as we can learn from experience and by reading history and
novels (see [65] for an uncontrolled approximation to the description of some
of the consequences of the unrestricted mechanization). The reason why it is
illusory to expect to discover objective laws of human history, including the
history ("time-evolution") of socio-economic development, was explained
prosaically in 1952:
"There can be no 'pure history'---history-in-itself, recorded from nobody's
point of view, for nobody's sake. The most objective history conceivable is
still a selection and an interpretation, necessarily governed by some special
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interests and based on some particular beliefs. It can be more nearly objective
if those interests and beliefs are explicit, out in the open, where they can be
freely examined and criticized.  Historians can more nearly approach the
detachment of the physicist when they realize that the historical 'reality' is
symbolic, not physical, and that they are giving as well as finding meanings.
The important meanings of history are not simply there, lined up, waiting to
be discovered."                                 
                                                            Herbert J. Muller, in     The      Uses    of   the     Past  [65]
One dimensional life                                                           
"The nineteenth century, in western Europe and North America, saw the
beginning of a process, today being completed by corporate capitalism, by
which every tradition which has previously mediated between man and
nature was broken."
                                                                     John Berger, in     About     Looking   [66]
John Berger, in a very beautiful essay introducing the latest edition of    Pig
   Earth    [67], emphasizes what he calls the peasants' view of "circular time" in
contrast with the abstract idea of linear time used in Newtonian mechanics. A
related viewpoint was developed earlier by the Spengler [68], who was one is
three historians who attempted to construct evidence for a grand scheme
according to which human "history" evolves.
Following the anti-Newtonian Goethe, Spengler imagined human societies
as "organisms" moving toward a "destiny". "Destiny" represents a vague idea
of organic determinism that Goethe assumed to be in conflict with
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mechanistic time-evolution that proceeds via local cause and effect. "Destiny"
was imagined to be impossible to describe via mathematical ideas, via
Newtonian-style mechanism. In trying to make a distinction between global
"destiny" and local cause and effect Spengler was not aware of the idea of
attractors in dynamical systems theory, whereby time evolution mimics
"destiny" but proceeds purely mechanically according local cause and effect.
The Lie-Klein idea of invariance of geometry under coordinate
transformations, the forerunner of Nöther's theorem on symmetry,
invariance, and conservation laws in physics, may have inspired Spengler's
attempt to compare entirely different cultures, widely separated in time and
space, as they evolved toward "destinies" that he identified as fully-developed
civilizations.
Spengler characterized western (European/North American) "civilization"
in the following way: the entire countryside is dominated, Roman-style, by a
few extremely overpopulated cities called megalopolises. Traditional cultures,
derived from man's historic experience of wresting survival directly from
nature, have been replaced by the abstract driving force of late civilization, the
spirit of money-making. Spengler identified the transition from early Greek
culture to late Roman civilization as an earlier example of the nearly
"universal" evolution from local tribal culture to money-driven civilization.
In modern and postmodern civilization, in a single uncontrolled
approximation, all traditions and ideas that interfere with "progress" defined
as large-scale and efficient economic development are rejected as unrealistic
or irrelevant in the face of a one-dimensional quantitative position whose
units may be dollars or marks. The dialogue paraphrased below can be found
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on pg. 16 the book     Complexity,        Metaphors,        Models,      and      Reality   [32] about
complex adaptable systems in biology, economics, and other fields. A, A', and
A'', who are paraphrased, are theoretical physicists.
A: Why try to define measures of complexity? A measure of complexity is just
a number and that doesn't tell you anything about the system. Assume that
there's a particular state that you want to create, a slightly better state of the
economy, for example. Suppose that you want to know how complicated that
problem is to solve on a computer, and that you're able to characterize
complexity. One of the proposals of A' for defining the complexity of a
problem is 'what's the minimum amount of money you'd need in order to
solve it?'
A'': The cost is proportional to computer time.
A: Then maybe the unit of complexity should be "money". If you're able to
formalize the difficulty of solving the problem of making the economy
slightly better, and you find out that you can measure its complexity in terms
of dollars or yen, then that kind of measure would be extremely useful.
The prediction of a computable chaotic trajectory is limited, decimal by
decimal or bit by bit, by computation time, but there are also integrable many
body problems that are not complex but also require large amounts of marks
or dollars. A'' also asserts in the same book     Complexity   (pg. 11) that low
dimensional chaos is "not complex  in a true sense: ... the number bits
required for specification of where you are is highly limited." In part, this
assertion is false: note that the binary specification of a single state xn in the
46
logistic map f(x) = 4x(1-x) requires precisely N(n) = 2n(No - 2) + 2 bits, where No
is the number of bits in any simple initial condition xo = .ε1...εNo000... . If the
string representing xn is arbitrarily truncated to m≤N(n) bits, then after on the
order of m iterations the first bit (and all other bits) in xn', where n' ≈ n + m, is
completely wrong [7]. Multiplication of two finite binary strings of arbitrary
length cannot be carried out on any fixed-state machine [5], and if
multiplication is done incorrectly at any stage then after only a few more
iterations the bits in xn cannot be known even to one-bit accuracy. I expect that
the complexity of a dynamical system, like fractal dimensions and Liapunov
exponents, can not be described by a single number.
"Paradise...was..the invention of a relatively leisured class. ... Work is the
condition for equality. ... bourgeois and Marxist ideals of equality presume a
world of plenty, they demand equal rights before a cornucopia ... to be
constructed by science and the advancement of knowledge. ... The peasant
ideal of equality recognizes a world of scarcity ... mutual fraternal aid in
struggling against this scarcity and a just sharing of what the world produces.
Closely connected with the peasant's recognition, as a survivor, of scarcity is
his recognition of man's relative ignorance. He may admire knowledge and
the fruits of knowledge but he never supposes that the advance of knowledge
reduces the extent of the unknown. ... Nothing in his experience encourages
him to believe in final causes ... . The unknown can only be eliminated
within the limits of a laboratory experiment. Those limits seem to him to be
naive.
                                                                         John Berger, in    Pig    Earth    [67]
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Figure Captions
1. Samuelson's question: Is it a bird or an antelope? Answer: neither, it's a
continuous line between two points plus a closed curve that, unlike both
birds and antelopes, is topologically equivalent to a straight line plus a circle
(from Samuelson [3]).
2. Successive maxima zn of a numerically-computed time series x3(t) for the
Lorenz model are plotted against each other (from McCauley [21]). The
drawing of a single continuous curve through all of these points would
violate the time-reversibility.
3. Assignment of the symbols L and R for a unimodal map (from McCauley
[21]).
4. The complete binary tree defines the topologic universality class of the
binary tent map, and all unimodal maps of the unit interval that peak at or
above unity and contract intervals exponentially fast in backward iteration
(from McCauley [21]).
5. An n-bit sliding window (shown for n = 1, 2, and 3) is used to read a section
of a binary symbol sequence in order to discover the corresponding orbital
statistics, described by histograms with 2n bins (from McCauley [21]).
